Every authority cited in the statute (model_act_v3_4.txt) and the Comments (model_act_v3_4_companion.md), with the provision or note that cites it and the proposition it is cited for. Built for verification: a reviewer should be able to check the project’s citations without reading the documents that contain them.
Scope. Statute and Comments only. The drafting record (audit/record.md), the dossier, and the standards notes carry hundreds of further sources with their own inline flags; those are evidence apparatus, not the Act’s authority base, and are not listed here.
That exclusion was not a decision, and saying so is the point of this paragraph. This table was compiled on 20 August 2026. The files that cite the law below were written on the 21st. Nobody chose to leave them out; they did not exist yet, and describing the omission as deliberate would be a rationalization dressed as a policy. The decision is being taken now, in the open, and it is this: Files in standards/ now cite a great deal of law directly — 18 U.S.C. §§ 4, 1001, 1030 and 1519, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331 and 333, Form FDA 1572, and a run of prosecutions in the same conduct — and none of it appears below. Those citations are graded where they sit, under the confidence rubric, which marks whether the primary was opened and by whom. Two different disciplines for two different jobs: this table is the authority base of the statute, kept small enough to stay accurate; the standards files are evidence, graded in place. An out-of-date table of authorities would be worse than none, so this one is not allowed to grow past what it can verify. Status. Compiled 20 August 2026 from the tagged v3.4 files. Pincites are given where the citing document gives them; where it does not, the entry says so, and closing that column is the remaining half of Open issues item 10 (the consolidated cite-check). Nothing here is a new claim: every line restates a citation already published elsewhere in the repository.
The three marks, and what each one promises. They are read-statuses, not emphasis, and nothing in a row uses them for anything else.
Mark
Means
✅
Read in the document by a person, and whatever the row quotes was seen in the document. A pincite is confirmed only where the row says the copy carried real pagination (E47)
⚠
Outstanding debt: not held, or held and unread, or read with a pincite that cannot be settled from the copy held. check_citations.py counts these, and they are the standing debt figure
◐
Model-mediated: reached through a tool that downloaded a page and had a language model answer against it. The metadata is usable; nothing marked ◐ may be published as a quotation. New on 26 August 2026 — see E57. A ◐ row always carries a ⚠ as well, because a lead is not a reading
I. Cases
The doctrine
Authority
Cited at
For
People v. Roscoe (Cal.) · People v. Matthews (Mich.) · People ex rel. Burris v. C.J.R. Processing, 647 N.E.2d 1035 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
⚠ None held, none read, all three known only through the Lyness survey — and they sit on the page a legislator is most likely to rely on. Retrieval failed on all three, 26 Aug 2026: Roscoe on a bot challenge, Burris because the URL tried returned HTTP 200 and a different case entirely (City of Chicago v. Telegraph Properties, No. 1-02-2869 — the digits in the URL are that docket, not this one). ⚠ A URL that answers is not a URL that answers correctly, and this table records the state RCO line as ungraded until the reporters are opened
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)
SEC. 6(a); n.2, n.6; lineage note
The responsible-relation standard — the officer answers for the public danger the operation creates
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975)
SEC. 0(b); n.6 (at 673–74); Amendment 8
✅ Read 25 Aug 2026. At 673–74, the prima facie case: evidence that the defendant had “by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and that he failed to do so.” At 668, “standing in responsible relation to a public danger.” At 672–73, the burden structure this Act’s SEC. 6(d) omits: powerlessness is “raised defensively at a trial on the merits,” the defendant “has the burden of coming forward with evidence,” and this “does not alter the Government’s ultimate burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt… his power”
United States v. DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626 (8th Cir. 2016)
n.6 (concurrence at 637)
✅ Read 25 Aug 2026. Murphy, Beam, Gruender, JJ. Gruender concurring: “Park requires a finding of negligence in order to convict a responsible corporate officer under § 331,” and “I read Park to require a showing of negligence before exposing a responsible corporate officer to imprisonment for the acts of a subordinate.” Beam dissenting: “There is no precedent that supports imprisonment without establishing some measure of a guilty mind”
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)
SEC. 1(a); n.2 (at 256)
The public-welfare category, and the bargain: strict liability without imprisonment
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991)
Amendment 22; the glossary
⚠ Text read 25 Aug 2026 in the opinion; pincites still unverified. Both sentences are verbatim in the opinion: “In a crime having knowledge as an express element, a mere showing of official responsibility under Dotterweich and Park is not an adequate substitute for direct or circumstantial proof of knowledge,” and “The seminal cases regarding the responsible corporate officer doctrine are United States v. Dotterweich… and United States v. Park.” The pages 55 and 51 are carried from CRS and could not be confirmed: the source read carries no star pagination. Footnote 15 is confirmed to be the willful-blindness footnote; whether the court approved the instruction there is not confirmed and the footnote text is still owed
United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998)
Amendment 22; known objections; SEC. 4 defense
⚠ Text read 25 Aug 2026 in the opinion; pincites unconfirmed (no star pagination, [E47]). Verbatim: the RCO instruction “relieved the government only of having to prove that defendant personally discharged or caused the discharge of a pollutant. The government still had to prove that the discharges violated the law and that defendant knew that the discharges were pollutants.” The version published here until today read “violated the [CWA]” and “were pol[lutants]” — see E48. The test: “a person is a ‘responsible corporate officer’ if the person has authority to exercise control over the corporation’s activity that is causing the discharges,” with no requirement of actual exercise or express vesting — broader than SEC. 4(a). The approved instruction’s three elements: knowledge of the fact; authority and capacity to prevent; failure to prevent. And the Park ratification paragraph, whose parenthetical records that Congress made the CWA a felony in 1987
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984)
Amendment 22
✅ READ, 26 Aug 2026. The rule is verbatim in the body of Part III.B: the district court “will be required to instruct the jury, inter alia, that in order to convict each defendant the jury must find that each knew that Johnson & Towers was required to have a permit, and knew that Johnson & Towers did not have a permit.” Carried for the split, not for the proposition ⛔ This row published half of it (E66). The next sentence qualifies it — “Depending on the evidence, the district court may also instruct the jury that such knowledge may be inferred” — and Part IV holds all elements must be knowing “but that such knowledge, including that of the permit requirement, may be inferred by the jury as to those individuals who hold the requisite responsible positions with the corporate defendant.” The court’s own gloss: its reading “does not impose on the government as difficult a burden as it fears” And it is confined to the subsection, not stated generally — “in light of our interpretation of section 6928(d)(2)(A)” — so “the Third Circuit’s rule” on knowledge of a legal requirement, unqualified, is broader than the opinion ⚠ 669 still unconfirmed, for a new reason — this row’s remaining debt. Three copies are held: the law.resource.org and FindLaw captures carry no star pagination; the OpenJuris capture filed as _second-copydoes carry it, and is a single page ending at *664. The only paginated copy stops five pages short (E47)
United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1996)
Amendment 22; Amendment 24; the criminal topic
✅ READ IN THE OPINION 26 Aug 2026 — law.resource.org reporter capture, held; ⚠ no star pagination, so nothing here may be pincited to a page (E47). Three things the repository had wrong, all from relying on a secondary summary.(1) The holding is about mistake of fact. Ahmad discharged “a large quantity of gasoline into the sewers of Conroe, Texas” from a leaking tank; the question was which elements “knowingly” attaches to, and the court’s worry is that “one who honestly and reasonably believes he is discharging water may find himself guilty of a felony if the substance turns out to be something else.” (2) The felony point is a confirming reason, not the ratio. The opinion reads: “The fact that violations of § 1319(c)(2)(A) are felonies punishable by years in federal prison confirms our view that they do not fall within the public welfare offense exception.” This repository has been publishing it the other way round, as the reason for the conclusion. (3) Ahmad does not think it is splitting with Weitzenhoff. On the Ninth Circuit’s case it says the court “was concerned almost exclusively with whether the language of the CWA creates a mistake-of-law defense. Both cases are easily distinguishable, for neither directly addresses mistake of fact or the statutory construction issues raised by Ahmad.” What is left of the objection: a Fifth Circuit reading of Staples that Weitzenhoff at 1286 n.7 refuses. What does not carry over to this Act: SEC. 6(b)(1) requires knowledge, and there is no frontier-AI analogue of a person who honestly believes the substance is water. ⚠ Ahmad cites the Ninth Circuit case as Weitzenhoff (9th Cir. 1994), the amended opinion’s year; this table uses 1993, the original’s
United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999); cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1102 (2000)
the glossary; SEC. 6(a); Amendment 24
✅ Read 26 Aug 2026 in the opinion, confirmed character-for-character on two independent sources and held in the working library.Holding: “We conclude from the plain language of 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A) that Congress intended that a person who acts with ordinary negligence in violating 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) may be subject to criminal penalties.” Due process: “It is well established that a public welfare statute may subject a person to criminal liability for his or her ordinary negligence without violating due process” (citing Balint). And the sentence this repository most needed: “The criminal provisions of the CWA constitute public welfare legislation” — twice, on Weitzenhoff. That is the Ninth Circuit holding the opposite of Ahmad.Canon: Congress wrote “gross negligence” into § 1321(b)(7)(D) and not into § 1319(c)(1)(A), and disparate inclusion is “presumed intentional”. ✅ Pincites CONFIRMED 26 Aug 2026 against the West reporter print (pp. 1116–1126, held in the working library): the roadmaster description at 1119; the holding, the gross-negligence canon, Balint, “public welfare legislation” and “without violating due process” all at 1121; “section 1319(c)(1)(A) does not violate due process” and Dotterweich at 1122; and a second, differently worded statement of the holding in CONCLUSION at 1126 — “In light of the plain language… may be subjected to criminal penalties” — which anyone quoting must not conflate with the 1121 sentence
United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc, 8 Aug. 1994
new 26 Aug 2026; Amendment 22; Amendment 24; the criminal topic
✅ READ 26 Aug 2026 in the amended opinion, in a copy carrying continuous West star pagination 1279–1299, held in the working library. The sentence Hanousek rests on, at 1286: “The criminal provisions of the CWA are clearly designed to protect the public at large from the potentially dire consequences of water pollution, see S.Rep. No. 99-50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1985), and as such fall within the category of public welfare legislation.” And the footnote that answers Ahmad, at 1286 n.7: “While the Staples opinion expresses concern with this evolution of enhanced punishments for public welfare offenses, it refrains from holding that public welfare offenses may not be punished as felonies” — citing the Court’s own reservation, “[w]e need not adopt such a definitive rule of construction to decide this case.” No U.S. Reports pincite is available from here: the copy gives that cite as “511 U.S. at —-, 114 S.Ct. at 1804”; the U.S. Reports page had not issued when this was printed, so there is no U.S. pincite to take from here. The same footnote reports three public welfare offenses already punished as felonies: International Minerals, 402 U.S. 558 (ten years where death or bodily injury results); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609–10 (1971) (five years, unregistered grenade); Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989) (two years, RCRA). The whole Staples passage, footnote 7 included, was added by the 8 Aug. 1994 amendment — the original opinion at 1 F.3d 1523 predates Staples, so this is the Ninth Circuit answering Staples deliberately rather than in passing. And the other half, which this Act must state itself. Five judges dissented from the order rejecting rehearing en banc (KLEINFELD, J., with REINHARDT, KOZINSKI, TROTT and T.G. NELSON, JJ.), at 1293–1299: “We have now made felons of a large number of innocent people doing socially valuable work” (1293), and the chilling-effect objection in its original form — “If they knew they risk three years in prison, some might decide that their pay, though sufficient inducement for processing the public’s wastes, is not enough to risk prison for doing their jobs” (1293). Ahmad is that dissent, adopted two years later by another circuit.Correction carried: this repository cited the public-welfare sentence to 1283. 1283 is what Hanousek cites for its standard of review; the sentence is at 1286. See E51
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994)
n.6; Amendment 22; Amendment 24; the criminal topic
✅ READ IN THE PRIMARY 26 Aug 2026 — Library of Congress U.S. Reports print, 41 pp., running-head pagination confirmed page by page, held on the source library. Every pincite in this repository that touched it is now settled, and the leading case against this Act misread it.At 607 ✅: “Typically, our cases recognizing such offenses involve statutes that regulate potentially harmful or injurious items” — Ahmad’s cite is right. At 618, and this is the whole finding, in one continuous passage: “Close adherence to the early cases described above might suggest that punishing a violation as a felony is simply incompatible with the theory of the public welfare offense. In this view, absent a clear statement from Congress that mens rea is not required, we should not apply the public welfare offense rationale to interpret any statute defining a felony offense as dispensing with mens rea. But see United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250 (1922).We need not adopt such a definitive rule of construction to decide this case, however. Instead, we note only that where, as here, dispensing with mens rea would require the defendant to have knowledge only of traditionally lawful conduct, a severe penalty is a further factor tending to suggest that Congress did not intend to eliminate a mens rea requirement.” ⛔ The sentence Ahmad quotes as Staples’s rule is the antecedent of “such a definitive rule of construction” — the view the very next sentence declines to adopt. See E64. ✅ And Weitzenhoff’s missing U.S. pincite is 618 — the reservation and the phrase Ahmad relies on are the same passage on the same page. The Court supplies its own counter-authorities: Balint in text, and at 617 n.14State v. Lindberg, 125 Wash. 51 (1923), “applying the public welfare offense rationale to a felony.” The operative trigger is not the penalty; it is “where, as here, dispensing with mens rea would require the defendant to have knowledge only of traditionally lawful conduct”
United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971)
new row 26 Aug 2026; Amendment 24
⚠ Known only as Weitzenhoff reports it at 1286 n.7, citing 609–10: five years’ imprisonment for possession of an unregistered grenade, offered as a public welfare offense punished as a felony. The cleanest single counterexample to Ahmad, and unread
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)
new 26 Aug 2026; the glossary; SEC. 6(a)
✅ READ IN THE PRIMARY 26 Aug 2026 — U.S. Reports, Library of Congress scan, pp. 250–254, running-head pagination confirmed page by page. The pincite Hanousek gives (252–53) is exact, and the sentence straddles the break precisely there: “Again where one deals with others and his mere negligence may be dangerous to them, as in selling diseased food or poison, the [253] policy of the law may, in order to stimulate proper care, require the punishment of the negligent person though he be ignorant of the noxious character of what he sells.” That is SEC. 6(a)’s architecture, stated in 1922: punish the negligent person though ignorant, to stimulate proper care. Also at 252–54: the State may provide “that he who shall do them shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance”; and the emphasis of such a statute “is evidently upon achievement of some social betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala in se.” This project carried Dotterweich (1943) and Park (1975) for months without the 1922 case both rest on
United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc)
the glossary
✅ READ, 26 Aug 2026, and the quotation is verbatim. “In the language of the instruction in this case, the government must prove, ‘beyond a reasonable doubt, that if the defendant was not actually aware . . . his ignorance in that regard was solely and entirely a result of . . . a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.’” The words are the trial court’s instruction, adopted by the en banc court — the glossary’s “classic formulation” is right about whose standard it became, imprecise about whose sentence it is (E73) Shared source worth knowing: Jewell quotes Glanville Williams, “A court can properly find wilful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant actually knew” — the same line Global-Tech uses at 770 ⚠ 704 stays unconfirmed — no star pagination (E47). Corroboration only, not a reading: Cincotta cites this discussion as “532 F.2d 697, 699–704”
United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238 (1st Cir. 1982)
the glossary
✅ READ, 26 Aug 2026, and the quotation is verbatim. “The conscious avoidance principle means only that specific knowledge may be inferred when a person knows other facts that would induce most people to acquire the specific knowledge in question.” ✅ “n.2” is confirmed — the passage sits in the numbered note beginning “2”, between the note quoting the indictment and note 3 ⛔ The glossary offers this as a narrowing of Jewell, and the next sentence widens it (E73): “Thus, if someone refuses to investigate an issue that cries out for investigation, we may presume that he already ‘knows’ the answer an investigation would reveal, whether or not he is ‘certain’.” The “only” limits what conscious avoidance is — circumstantial evidence of knowledge — not how far the inference reaches ⚠ 243 stays unconfirmed — no star pagination (E47)
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011)
the glossary
✅ READ IN THE U.S. REPORTS PRINT, 26 Aug 2026, and 769 is confirmed from the copy. The govinfo print carries real reporter pagination, so this row settles its own pincite. At 769, the two-part test: “all appear to agree on two basic requirements: (1) The defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact” — requirements that “give willful blindness an appropriately limited scope that surpasses recklessness and negligence.” At 770 the Court rejects the looser standard below: a “known risk” will not do, and “deliberate indifference” “does not require active efforts by an inducer to avoid knowing.” ⛔ This row previously called 769 “the constitutional ceiling” and that was wrong (E65): Global-Tech is a civil patent case under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), the passage is the Court’s distillation of what the circuits already agreed on, and no constitutional question is presented or decided. The opinion’s one constitutional touch is at 767 and concerns due-process limits on statutory presumptions of knowledge (Turner, Leary) — a different doctrine. And the doctrine runs criminal-to-civil: “well established in criminal law” (766), extended because “we can see no reason why the doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits” (768). Nothing limits it in criminal cases; the authority this Act cites for a criminal knowledge element is a civil case describing criminal practice. No debt outstanding: read in the reporter print, pincite settled
United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987)
the glossary; known objections
✅ READ, 26 Aug 2026. Collective knowledge, in the First Circuit’s own words: “A collective knowledge instruction is entirely appropriate in the context of corporate criminal liability. . . . Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific duties and operations into smaller components. The aggregate of those components constitutes the corporation’s knowledge of a particular operation.” The approved instruction, quoted in the opinion: “if Employee A knows one facet of the currency reporting requirement, B knows another facet of it, and C a third facet of it, the bank knows them all.” Upheld as “not only proper but necessary” for a bank with “the compartmentalized structure common to all large corporations” ⛔ This row previously dated the case 1984 and gave the “cannot plead innocence” sentence as this court’s holding. Both were wrong (E67): argued 4 Mar. and decided 10 June 1987, and that sentence is a block quotation from United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 (S.D. W. Va. 1974), quoted with approval — a district court’s words published here as a court of appeals’. The doctrine is corporate-only: knowledge “is imputed to the corporation” and no authority in its string aggregates onto a natural person, so it does not compete with SEC. 4 and the Act “declines” nothing it could have had A second approved theory this repository had never carried: organizational willful blindness — whether the entity “consciously avoided learning about and observing” its duties, provable by “flagrant organizational indifference” ⚠ no star pagination, so 856 stays the secondary source’s — this row’s remaining debt (E47)
United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
the glossary
⚠ At 1118: corporate intent “depends on the wrongful intent of specific employees” — the respondeat superior premise this Act builds on ⚠ NOT HELD. Retrieval attempted and deliberately abandoned 26 Aug 2026. law.resource.org’s public-domain reporter scans stop before volume 566 and CourtListener’s pages are behind a bot challenge. The only PDF located was a LexisNexis printout carrying a third party’s account name and session job number, which is not a thing this project files into a research library. ✅ HELD AND READ IN THE DOCUMENT 26 Aug 2026 — a FindLaw capture of the full opinion, 69 pp., now on the source library. The passage the glossary wants, verbatim: “Corporations may be held liable for specific intent offenses based on the ‘knowledge and intent’ of their employees. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909); see United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 125 (1958). Because a corporation only acts and wills by virtue of its employees, the proscribed corporate intent depends on the wrongful intent of specific employees.” If that survives reading it is a better authority than the one the glossary carries, because it names the mechanism — corporate intent derived from identified employees — which is the exact inverse of what SEC. 4 does. Held under a MODEL-MEDIATED-FETCH label (E57). ⚠ No star pagination on that route, so 1118 stays unconfirmed, and the fetch did not confirm the docket, the date, or the 566 F.3d citation — a second D.C. Circuit Philip Morris opinion exists from 2012. ✅ All three settled 26 Aug 2026, and the citation this table publishes is right. The Solicitor General’s own petition states: “The opinions of the court of appeals … are reported at 566 F.3d 1095 and 396 F.3d 1190.” Appeal Nos. 06-5267, 06-5268, argued and decided 22 May 2009. ✅ And the D.C. Circuit’s own opinion PDF is located at last — cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/…/06-5267-1181914.pdf — so the clean print this row has been asking for is one download away and the LexisNexis printout stays refused. ⚠ Near miss recorded: a public-health litigation tracker carries this case at 556 F.3d 1095 in its page title and its URL, and that nearly produced a “correction” to a correct citation. See E58
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6)
E42; the glossary; SEC. 4
✅ Read 25 Aug 2026, verbatim: “For the purpose of this subsection, the term ‘person’ means, in addition to the definition contained in section 1362(5) of this title, any responsible corporate officer.” Governs the whole of subsection (c), so it governs the negligence tier at (c)(1)
⚠ Every authority in this block is quoted from a secondary source — the Congressional Research Service’s Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, Lyness, 64 B.C. L. Rev. 253, or Hustis and Gotanda, 25 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 169 — and none has been read in the reporter. They are on the retrieval list. Under E22 none may be described as verified, and no outreach may cite them as settled.
Culpability and elements
Authority
Cited at
For
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994)
n.6
The modern presumption of scienter where penalties are severe. Read-status and the felony question live on the criminal-topic row above; this row records n.6’s use only
Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019)
n.6
Same line; express-scienter construction honored where it belongs
Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S. 450 (2022)
n.6
Same line; SEC. 6(b)(1) states its mental element expressly
Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014)
SEC. 10(c)(2)(D), in text; n.21
The meaning of but-for cause in a results-enhanced offense
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)
n.21, n.22
Facts raising the ceiling are jury elements
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013)
n.21, n.22
Facts raising the floor are jury elements
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)
n.22
The bare fact of a prior conviction may be judge-found
Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024)
n.22
Anything beyond that bare fact goes to the jury — SEC. 6(b)(2) is drafted inside the exception
Gates-up-or-down access construction; permission, not technical enforcement, defines the gate
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)
the glossary; known objections
✅ READ, 26 Aug 2026, AND 971 IS CONFIRMED FROM THE COPY HELD. The reprint carries star pagination *960–*972 and the passage falls between *971 and *972; the row’s open question is answered yes (E68). The oversight standard, verbatim and whole: “Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss is predicated upon ignorance of liability creating activities within the corporation, as in Graham or in this case, in my opinion only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists—will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.” The published form drops “in my opinion” without an ellipsis (E48) and drops the confinement to claims predicated on ignorance — it is not a general oversight standard And at the same page the court reserves the case this Act is about: “this case presents no occasion to apply a principle to the effect that knowingly causing the corporation to violate a criminal statute constitutes a breach of a director’s fiduciary duty,” citing Roth v. Robertson and Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. The Caremark bar was set for ignorance and expressly not for knowing violation, which is what SEC. 6(b) reaches Provenance limit stands and is narrower than it was read as being: a Thomson Reuters/Westlaw reprint with KeyCite headers, hosted by Penn Carey Law, not an official court print — a limit on whose text this is, not on whether pages are marked. No debt outstanding: read, pincite settled
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006)
the glossary; known objections
✅ Read 25 Aug 2026. Slip op. 17, the conditions predicate for director oversight liability, and “known duty to act… conscious disregard”; slip op. 15, when a failure to act in good faith may be shown
Marchand v. Barnhill (Del. 18 June 2019) (Strine, C.J.)
known objections; the glossary
✅ Read 25 Aug 2026. Slip op. 31, “the board must make a good faith effort — i.e., try — to put in place a reasonable board-level system of monitoring and reporting”; slip op. 36, “food safety was essential and mission critical”; slip op. 32, the three things that did not exist
In re McDonald’s Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2021-0324-JTL (Del. Ch. 26 Jan. 2023) (Laster, V.C.)
known objections; the glossary
✅ Read 25 Aug 2026. Slip op. 2: “This decision clarifies that corporate officers owe a duty of oversight” — the extension from directors to officers, and the move this Act makes independently
In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig. (Del. Ch. 31 May 2011) (Strine, V.C.)
known objections; the glossary
✅ Read 25 Aug 2026. Slip op. 46: “Delaware law does not charter law breakers,” and the statutory floor — Delaware corporations may pursue only “lawful business” by “lawful acts.” This is the whole of the surviving business-judgment answer; see E46
8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7)
the glossary; known objections
✅ Read in the Code, 25 Aug 2026. Exculpation reaches “monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director or officer” only, and cannot reach “(ii) … acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law,” nor “(v) An officer in any action by or in the right of the corporation.” On its face it cannot touch a duty imposed by a statute outside the DGCL, still less a criminal one
8 Del. C. § 145(a), (e), (g)
the glossary; known objections
✅ Read in the Code, 25 Aug 2026. (a) indemnification in a criminal proceeding only where the person “had no reasonable cause to believe the person’s conduct was unlawful”; (e) advancement “upon receipt of an undertaking… to repay such amount if it shall ultimately be determined that such person is not entitled to be indemnified”; (g) insurance may “exclude from coverage… any deliberate criminal or deliberate fraudulent act… established by a final, nonappealable adjudication.” § 145(e) and SEC. 7(b)(5) are the same mechanism
X.AI LLC v. Bonta, No. 2:25-cv-12295 (C.D. Cal.), on appeal No. 26-1591 (9th Cir.)
known objections; the standing watch
✅ Complaint and Ninth Circuit docket read 25 Aug 2026, both held in the working library. Four counts: per se takings, regulatory takings, compelled speech, vagueness — the ordering is the finding
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)
known objections; the takings topic
✅ READ IN THE OPINION 26 Aug 2026 and ✅ PINCITE NOW CONFIRMED against the Library of Congress U.S. Reports scan (39 pp., running-head pagination page by page), which supersedes the WIPO Lex copy that carried none. The holding sentence runs 1003–04 exactly as this project cited it, and it is narrower than the sentence we published: “We therefore hold that to the extent that Monsanto has an interest in its health, safety, and environmental data cognizable as a trade-secret property right under Missouri law, that property right is protected by the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” The shorter formulation this table quoted — “a trade secret is property protected by the Fifth Amendment Taking Clause” — is verbatim but is the Court describing its holding in footnote 9 at 1004, not the holding sentence. Why the qualification is the useful half: the property right is the State’s creation, so a State that does not create it does not take it, and the takings answer for a state statute is stronger than the footnote alone suggests
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139 (2021)
known objections
✅ READ, 26 Aug 2026. The per se limb in the Court’s own words: “The essential question is not . . . whether the government action at issue comes garbed as a regulation (or statute, or ordinance, or miscellaneous decree). It is whether the government has physically taken property for itself or someone else—by whatever means—or has instead restricted a property owner’s ability to use his own property. . . . Whenever a regulation results in a physical appropriation of property, a per se taking has occurred, and Penn Central has no place.” ⛔ The “sine qua non” this row was cited for is not the Court’s phrase (E70). It appears once, in a see also parenthetical reporting what an article “call[s]” the right to exclude: see also Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730 (1998). The Court’s own formulations in that paragraph are quoted from Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 179–180 (1979) — “a fundamental element of the property right”, “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle” — and that is where the pincite for this proposition belongs The words “trade secret” and “intangible” do not appear in the opinion, and neither does Ruckelshaus. The case concerns a right to “physically enter and occupy the growers’ land”; extending it to compelled production of records is an argument no authority in this row supplies ⚠ 150 cannot be settled and stays the plaintiff’s brief’s. Two copies held: the supremecourt.gov slip opinion carries slip pages, and the copy filed as 594-US-139_2021_Justia carries no internal reporter pagination at all — its reporter citation lives in the filename and URL, which is a label (E58), not pagination
Live enforcement and litigation — rows opened 26 August 2026
Every caption here was cited in the repository’s prose with no row, and therefore no read-status, until today. Two of the four are the same case under two names, which is why the checker counted four.
Authority
Cited at
For
Attorney General of the State of Florida v. OpenAI Global, LLC — also cited in this repository as Florida v. OpenAI and Samuel Altman
new row 26 Aug 2026; the enforcement record
✅ The filed-stamped complaint is held from 26 Aug 2026, 83 pp., from the Attorney General’s own site. Unread. Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Highlands County, against the OpenAI entities and Sam Altman personally. ⚠ Two captions for one case. Whoever reads it should settle which is the caption and make the repository use one
United States of America & X.AI LLC v. Philip J. Weiser — also cited in this repository as xAI v. Weiser
new row 26 Aug 2026; the enforcement record; the takings topic
⚠ Unread; a docket metadata stub is held, not the complaint. No. 1:26-cv-01515, D. Colo., filed 9 Apr. 2026, confirmed against the CourtListener RECAP index 26 Aug 2026. This is the case whose takings count the repository has been reading Ruckelshaus and Cedar Point through — see those rows, both of which are now read or held in the primary instead
Sementilli v. Trinidad Corp., 162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998)
new row 26 Aug 2026; cited nowhere, rowed as a warning
⛔ NOT AN AUTHORITY OF THIS PROJECT AND MUST NEVER BE CITED AS ONE. It shares the citation 162 F.3d 1015 with United States v. Iverson, and it is the case a search for that citation returns first. A retrieval on 26 Aug 2026 caught it one step before filing. This row exists so the next reader finds the warning before the trap — the same reason WRONG-IVERSON-NOT-OUR-CASE and NOT-XAI-COUNSEL are written into filenames on the source library
Ontario Provincial Council of Carpenters’ Pension Trust Fund v. Walton, 294 A.3d 65 (Del. Ch. 2023), C.A. No. 2021-0827-JTL
governance; known objections
✅ BOTH OPINIONS NOW HELD AND READ, 26 Aug 2026 — and this row’s previous warning was wrong. C.A. 2021-0827-JTL produced two opinions two weeks apart: a laches opinion of 12 April 2023 (64 pp.) and a demand-futility memorandum opinion of 26 April 2023 (123 pp.), both on the source library, both from the Delaware courts’ own service or a mirror of it, Laster V.C. ⛔ E46’s finding that this case carried two fabricated quotations is WITHDRAWN (E60). Both are verbatim in the 26 April opinion, which E46 never opened: at slip op. 76, “When directors make a business decision that carries legal risk, but which otherwise involves legally compliant conduct, then the business judgment rule protects that decision”; and across slip op. 77–78, “the decision to pursue the project would constitute a conscious decision to violate the law, the business judgment rule would not apply, and the directors would be acting in bad faith.” A correct quotation was deleted from a public page on the strength of a check run against the wrong document. ⚠ Pincites 90 and 92 remain unconfirmed: both copies carry slip pages, not Atlantic Reporter pages, and slip-to-reporter offsets are not computable (E47). And the laches opinion is a separate document with separate content — its slip op. 2 describes the Massey Claim, and nothing from one opinion may be cited to the other ⚠ Which of the two is reported at 294 A.3d 65 is still unsettled, and the source library cannot settle it (E71): neither slip opinion carries an Atlantic Reporter stamp, which is ordinary for a slip. ⛔ The one source that answered the question is withdrawn — a ◐ model-mediated row in research/verification_record.md gave “58 pp., reported 294 A.3d 65” for the 26 April opinion, and that opinion runs to slip page 121; E59 had already caught fetches of this family reporting 56 or 58 pages for a 64-page document. A retrieval wrong on the page count is not authority for the citation it supplied in the same breathThe court supplies the short form this repository needs: at slip op. 70 of the later opinion, Laster V.C. cites the earlier as Walmart Laches, 2023 WL 2904946 (Del. Ch. Apr. 12, 2023) — adopt Walmart Laches and Walmart Demand Futility and the E59 collision cannot recur Counting note for pincites: each PDF carries two unnumbered front pages, so the numbered slip pages run to 62 and 121 within documents of 64 and 123 pages; “slip op. 76” is the numbered page
Penalties and proportionality
Authority
Cited at
For
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)
new row 26 Aug 2026 — cited in the repository’s prose and never graded until now; the proportionality topic
✅ Held in the working library from 26 Aug 2026, unread. Library of Congress U.S. Reports scan, so it can settle its own pincites when read. Carried for the deferential end of the proportionality line, against which SEC. 10(c)(3)’s valve is measured
Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, 331 Conn. 53 (2019)
new row 26 Aug 2026 — cited in the repository’s prose and never graded until now
⚠ NOT HELD. Retrieval failed 26 Aug 2026: CourtListener’s HTML is behind a bot challenge and jud.ct.gov refused the connection. Cited in prose with no source on the source library
Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146 (2019)
n.19, n.21
The Excessive Fines Clause binds the states
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998)
n.19, n.21
Gross-disproportionality test
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring, at 1001)
n.21
Federal noncapital review forbids only grossly disproportionate extremes
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam)
n.21
Forty years for nine ounces upheld — successful challenges “exceedingly rare”
✅ READ, 26 Aug 2026, and n.18’s “no-fault” characterization is confirmed against the opinion. The holding: “we hold that SOX 304 allows the SEC to seek disgorgement from CEOs and CFOs even if the triggering restatement did not result from misconduct on the part of those officers.” Textual: “as a result of misconduct” modifies “the material noncompliance of the issuer”, so “it is the issuer’s misconduct that matters, and not the personal misconduct of the CEO or CFO” — and Congress “knew how to draft a statute that would limit the disgorgement remedy to cases of officer or director misconduct, and chose not to do so.” First in the courts of appeals, in its own words: “we are aware of no circuit court that has addressed this issue” ⛔ This row said “district courts had split for fourteen years” and the opinion describes no split (E72). It says “most district courts to have examined it have concluded” against a personal-misconduct requirement and cites four going one way — Jenkins, Baker, Geswein, Life Partners Holdings — with no contrary decision anywhere in the discussion. “Split” was the law firm’s word Disambiguation, and it held up: not the Jensen at n.22, which is the DOJ food-safety prosecution in D. Colo. Two cases, one surname, opposite subjects ⚠ No F.3d pagination. The Ninth Circuit’s own PDF carries that issue’s slip pages only, so 1100 and any pincite stay the secondary source’s (E47)
Liu v. SEC, 591 U.S. 71 (2020)
n.18
✅ READ, 26 Aug 2026, and n.18’s account of it is exact. “The Court holds today that a disgorgement award that does not exceed a wrongdoer’s net profits and is awarded for victims is equitable relief permissible under §78u(d)(5),” the limit existing “to avoid transforming an equitable remedy into a punitive sanction” Open question this reading raises against n.18 (E74): n.18’s next clause, “a statutory clawback is not so confined”, is offered without authority, and Liu’s ceiling attaches to relief that is equitable — which is what the Ninth Circuit calls SOX 304’s reimbursement provision, “an equitable and not a legal remedy”, SEC v. Jensen, citing Jasper, 678 F.3d 1116, 1130. The two authorities n.18 cites in one breath pull against each other. SEC. 7 reaches Liu’s destination anyway, so the design is unaffected and the reasoning is ⚠ Slip opinion: “Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)”, so no U.S. Reports pincite can be taken from it (E47)
Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
n.10, n.22
Exclusion after Park-doctrine convictions: power upheld, duration remanded
Preemption and federalism
Authority
Cited at
For
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)
new row 26 Aug 2026 — cited in the repository’s prose and never graded until now; the federalism topic
✅ Held in the working library from 26 Aug 2026, unread. Library of Congress U.S. Reports scan, which can settle its own pincites
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)
new row 26 Aug 2026 — cited in the repository’s prose and never graded until now; the federalism topic
✅ Held in the working library from 26 Aug 2026, unread. Library of Congress U.S. Reports scan
National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U.S. 356 (2023)
n.17; extraterritoriality
✅ READ, 26 Aug 2026. “A close look at those cases reveals nothing like the ‘almost per se’ rule against laws that have the ‘practical effect’ of ‘controlling’ extraterritorial commerce that petitioners posit . . . . Baldwin, Brown-Forman, and Healydid not mean to do so much.” ⛔ n.17 says the case “removed” that rule, and the Court says it never existed (E75) — the rule is attributed throughout to petitioners (“Petitioners insist . . .”), and the Court declines to find it in the line. Declining to recognize a rule leaves less to restore than abolishing one, so n.17 understated its own authority. The rest of n.17 holds: the line is re-read as being about discrimination — laws that “hoard” commerce “for the benefit of in-state merchants” — and what remains is Pike ⚠ Slip opinion: “Cite as: 598 U. S. ____“, so no U.S. Reports pincite from this copy
Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (Dec. Term 1860)
audit/record.md; extradition scope
✅ READ in the Library of Congress U.S. Reports scan, 26 Aug 2026, and the quotation is verbatim: “The word ‘crime’ of itself includes every offence, from the highest to the lowest in the grade of offences, and includes what are called ‘misdemeanors,’ as well as treason and felony.” ✅ The overruling is correctly confined and the syllabus separates the holdings the same way: point 4 gives the scope of “treason, felony, or other crime”; points 8 and 9 are the mandamus holding — “Congress cannot coerce a State officer, as such, to perform any duty” and “upon that ground only, this motion for a mandamus was overruled”. It is 8 and 9 that Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987) overruled; the scope holding stands, which is what the Act relies on Reader’s note on this copy: the scan is genuinely paginated but its page numbers are OCR-damaged and irregular — markers jump 97 to 105 — so no page was computed and none is published (E47). Nothing turns on it; the citing file gives no pincite
Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, 609 U.S. ___, No. 24-1068 (2026)
n.13
Express clauses read textually; presumption not invoked; Bates confined
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005)
n.13
Confined by Durnell to efficacy claims
Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U.S. 191 (2020)
n.14
Criminal enforcement remains primarily a state responsibility; overlap is not conflict
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011)
n.14
Savings-clause construction
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)
n.14
The honest counterweight — state criminal law is not immune
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009)
n.14
Presumption survives for implied preemption
Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 579 U.S. 115 (2016)
n.14
Not for express clauses, in most circuits
Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 587 U.S. 761 (2019) (plurality)
n.14
Preemptive purpose from text and structure — cited as persuasive, never as holding
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (plurality, at 488)
n.14
Quoted within Virginia Uranium
Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453 (2018)
n.15
Congress may not command a State not to legislate — answers a bare moratorium only
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987) (at 684)
n.15
Severability turns on whether the remainder is fully operative
⚠ NOT HELD, NOT READ. Cited against this Act: fair notice, and the limit on punishing a wholly passive failure to act where the actor had no reason to know a duty existed. The vagueness objection is the one that most often kills a bill in committee and this project has never opened its leading case
⚠ NOT HELD, NOT READ. The modern vagueness line: a criminal standard that leaves grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by conduct is void. Cited against a duty framed as “reasonable safeguards” where the penalty is prison
Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999)
⚠ NOT HELD, NOT READ, and the citation itself is unverified — recorded as the case the First Amendment objection names, source code as protected expression, left half-open on rehearing en banc. Nothing in this repository has checked the reporter citation, the posture, or whether it survives; it is a retrieval lead and not an authority
Sveen v. Melin, 584 U.S. 811 (2018) (No. 16-1432)
audit/record.md; the Contract Clause
✅ READ, 26 Aug 2026. The two-step test, verbatim: the threshold is whether the state law has “operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship”; “[i]f such factors show a substantial impairment, the inquiry turns to whether the state law is” drawn appropriately ✅ 811 is confirmed, and not from this copy — audit/record.md records it against the preliminary print, “Volume 584 U.S. Part 2, Pages 811–836”. This row’s warning that no U.S. Reports pincite was available was true of the copy and false of the repository (E49, E75) ⚠ Slip opinion: “Cite as: 584 U. S. ____“, so no internal pincite may be taken from it
Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983)
new row 26 Aug 2026 — cited in the repository’s prose and never graded until now; the Contracts Clause
✅ Held in the working library from 26 Aug 2026, unread. Library of Congress U.S. Reports scan
Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991)
new row 26 Aug 2026 — cited in the repository’s prose and never graded until now; pre-deprivation process
✅ Held in the working library from 26 Aug 2026, unread. Library of Congress U.S. Reports scan
Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress Int’l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
docs/questions.md; the free-to-read rule
✅ READ, 26 Aug 2026, and docs/questions.md states it accurately. The court’s own summary: “as law, the model codes enter the public domain and are not subject to the copyright holder’s exclusive prerogatives. As model codes, however, the organization’s works retain their protected status.” ⛔ This row was cited-for “why this Act is CC0”, and the second half of that sentence is about this Act (E75): Veeck is two-sided, and an unenacted model act is not in the public domain under it. The CC0 dedication is a choice, well supported by Veeck’s reasoning — the text becomes public domain the moment any legislature enacts it, so reserved rights expire on success — but Veeck is not authority that it must be ⚠ No star pagination; nothing may be pincited to it (E47)
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)
n.16
Factual, uncontroversial commercial disclosure
NIFLA v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755 (2018)
n.16
The narrowing, and what it preserved
X Corp. v. Bonta, 116 F.4th 888 (9th Cir. 2024)
n.16
Compelled contested characterization — always cited as a preliminary-injunction likelihood ruling
CTIA v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2019)
n.16
Objective compelled content survives
National Ass’n of Wheat Growers v. Bonta, 85 F.4th 1263 (9th Cir. 2023)
n.16
Outside Zauderer; failed Central Hudson
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (plurality)
n.16, n.20
False-statement offenses expressly preserved
Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (2006)
n.16, n.26
Compelled speech incidental to conduct regulation
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926)
n.24, n.25
Vagueness in a criminal duty
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)
n.24, n.25
Same
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964)
n.24
Retroactive judicial enlargement — the one-way ratchets answer it
Records, privilege, and delegation
Authority
Cited at
For
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) (at 67–68)
n.26
The three premises of the required-records doctrine
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948)
n.26
Required records outside the privilege
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968)
n.26
The boundary this Act stays inside
Baltimore City Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990)
n.26
Compelled production within a regulatory regime
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991)
n.3
Delegation confined by specific restrictions
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940)
n.3, n.24
Static, agency-supervised incorporation
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 590 U.S. 429 (2020)
standards/interim_standards.md; README
Government edicts carry no copyright
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979)
audit register F15 (not in statute or Comments)
Rational-connection limit on permissive inferences — flagged for n.4
II. Federal statutes and regulations
Authority
Cited at
For
18 U.S.C. § 1001
n.20
The free-standing false-statement structure
18 U.S.C. § 1350
n.8; n.19; SEC. 8
✅ Read in full 25 Aug 2026. Two tiers, both requiring knowledge: (c)(1) “Whoever certifies… knowing that the periodic report… does not comport” — $1,000,000 / 10 years; (c)(2) “Whoever willfully certifies… knowing” — $5,000,000 / 20 years. There is no tier below knowledge. SEC. 8’s second limb (“reckless certification without reasonable inquiry”) therefore has no counterpart in the model the Act says it is built on, and SEC. 6(a), where that limb routes, requires only failure of due care. See PF-7
18 U.S.C. § 1365(a)
SEC. 10(c); n.21
The harm tier’s geometry — twenty years per serious injury; life where death results
18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(3)–(4)
v3.5 queue, Amendment 1 (adopted, not yet landed)
The injury definition replacing 21 C.F.R. § 803.3(w). Cite with care: these definitions sat at § 1365(g)(3)–(4) until 2 December 2002, when Pub. L. 107-307 (the Product Packaging Protection Act of 2002) added a new subsection (f) and pushed the old (f) and (g) down to (g) and (h). Authority predating that amendment cites the same words under the old letter
18 U.S.C. § 1519
n.23
Destruction “in relation to or contemplation of” — restated as an affirmative hold
18 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(1)
n.23
The five-year statutory floor extended by rule to seven
18 U.S.C. § 3571(b), (d)
n.19; SEC. 10(b)
✅ Read 25 Aug 2026. (b)(5) is exactly as cited: “for a Class A misdemeanor that does not result in death, not more than $100,000” — and SEC. 10(b)’s one-year maximum is what makes the offense Class A (18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6)), so the classification and the amount agree. One divergence. § 3571(d) allows “not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss”; SEC. 10(b) and 10(c) take only the gain limb (“twice the gross pecuniary gain to the person”). In this Act’s paradigm case a controlling person’s personal gain from failing to halt may be near zero while third-party loss is vast, so the limb dropped is the one that would bite. Probably deliberate — SEC. 10(c)(4) restitution answers loss and the fine strips gain, which avoids counting loss twice — but the citation says “as to amount” and the source’s amount has two limbs
A note on the donor of the harm tier, added 25 August 2026. § 1365 is not a stray federal section. It was enacted whole by Pub. L. 98-127, § 1, Oct. 13, 1983, 97 Stat. 831, whose own short title is the Federal Anti-Tampering Act, and which also enacted 35 U.S.C. § 155A. The LII page and its notes are held on the source library; the provenance below is read from them rather than inferred.
Three things the amendment history gives this Act, and the first is the most useful.
One. Congress swept its own fixed dollar fines out of this statute eleven years after enacting them. As passed in 1983 the section carried four hard numbers: $25,000, $100,000, $50,000 and $10,000. In 1994, Pub. L. 103-322 § 330016(1)(L), (O), (Q), (S) replaced every one of them with “fined under this title”, which routes to 18 U.S.C. § 3571. That is exactly the choice this Act already makes at n.19, where individual fines take § 3571(b) parity and the criminal fines carry § 3571(d)’s twice-the-gross-gain alternative, against the cautionary example of the FDCA’s $1,000 sitting nominal since 1938. The design preference is now a documented federal correction, made by Congress, to the very statute this Act’s harm tier borrows from. A model act offered to fifty legislatures inherits the same decay problem and the same fix.
Two. The geometry has held for forty-three years across three amendments. 1990 (Pub. L. 101-647), 1994 (Pub. L. 103-322) and 2002 (Pub. L. 107-307) touched the fines, the lettering and a punctuation mark. The tier itself — twenty years where serious bodily injury results, any term of years or life where death results — has never been reopened. A drafter borrowing it is borrowing a structure Congress built for a novel hazard class and has left alone ever since.
Three, and it belongs to this project’s own habits. Pub. L. 101-647, § 3544 exists, in part, to insert “opening quotation marks before ‘device’” in what is now § 1365(h)(1)(A). Congress passed an Act to add a missing quotation mark. Enacted federal law keeps an the corrections register too; ours is at the errata and is not a sign of an unusually careless draft.
Credit where it is owed: the move to § 1365’s injury definition came from outside this project, in one sentence, from a criminal-law scholar who has not elected to be named. It is Amendment 1. | 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a) | n.19 | Means consideration in fixing fines | | 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a)–(b) | SEC. 10(c)(3); n.21 | Concurrency default; the per-offense factor duty | | 18 U.S.C. § 3663A | SEC. 10(c)(4); n.21 | ✅ Read 25 Aug 2026. Exact match on the operative words. (a)(1): restitution “to the victim of the offense or, if the victim is deceased, to the victim’s estate” — SEC. 10(c)(4)’s “or to the person’s estate” is the statute’s own phrasing. (a)(2) victim: “a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense.” Note for completeness: § 3663A(c) makes restitution mandatory only for an enumerated list (crimes of violence, property/fraud offenses, 21 U.S.C. § 856(a), Rodchenkov, 18 U.S.C. § 1365, § 670). An offense under this Act is not on it; the Act imposes the duty directly, so “per the structure of” is the correct and only claim. § 1365 being on that list is a coherence point never made: the Act’s restitution model and its serious-injury source (Amendment 1, § 1365(h)(3)) are the same federal statute | | 21 U.S.C. § 331(e) | SEC. 5(e); n.26 | The two-limb records offense | | 21 U.S.C. § 332 | SEC. 10(d)(1); n.10 | ✅ Read 25 Aug 2026. (a) jurisdiction “for cause shown to restrain violations of section 331” — the same shape as SEC. 10(d)(1). (b) is the subsection the Act needed and did not take: “In case of violation of an injunction or restraining order issued under this section, which also constitutes a violation of this chapter, trial shall be by the court, or, upon demand of the accused, by a jury.” SEC. 10(d)(2) creates exactly that overlap — operation of a suspended configuration “is contempt and a violation of SEC. 5(a)” — and says nothing about the mode of trial. See PF-8 | | 21 U.S.C. § 334 | SEC. 10(d)(2); n.10 | ✅ Read 25 Aug 2026, and the analogy is looser than the citation claims. § 334 is an in rem proceeding against a thing: an adulterated or misbranded article “proceeded against… on libel of information and condemned,” with procedure that “shall conform, as nearly as may be, to the procedure in admiralty,” and “on demand of either party any issue of fact… shall be tried by jury.” SEC. 10(d)(2) takes the thing-directed idea — the remedy attaches to an identified model version and configuration rather than to a person — and none of the procedure: no in rem form, no intervention by claimants, no jury. Functionally it is prospective and injunctive, which makes it § 332’s relative rather than § 334’s. A suspension binding “any person with notice” is a remedy against software that binds non-parties, and § 334 answered that with admiralty procedure while this Act answers it with notice | | 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1)–(2) | n.19, n.22 | ✅ Read 25 Aug 2026. (a)(1): “imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than $1,000” — no mental state stated. (a)(2): “if any person commits such a violation after a conviction of him under this section has become final, or commits such a violation with the intent to defraud or mislead” — three years / $10,000. Confirms the two claims the record makes at n.22 and D.5: the two routes to the felony are alternative, and the source carries no lookback limit, so the Act’s [ten]-year washout is the more merciful departure the record says it is | | 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) | n.21 | Ceiling structure — twenty base, life where death results | | 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) | SEC. 10(a); n.10, n.19 | ✅ Read 25 Aug 2026. The six factors are transplanted verbatim and in the source’s own order: “the seriousness of the violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation, any history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and such other matters as justice may require.” Two divergences this row previously concealed. (i) § 1319(d) has no penalty floor. It makes economic benefit a factor to consider; SEC. 10(a)’s “shall not be less than the economic benefit or savings derived” is the Act’s own addition, defensible on the deterrence scholarship at n.19 but not the structure of § 1319(d), and this row until 25 Aug 2026 credited the source with it. (ii) SEC. 10(a) reads “economic benefit or savings”; § 1319(d) says “the economic benefit (if any)” and 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (checked as the obvious alternative donor, also read 25 Aug) says “the economic benefit of noncompliance.” Neither federal source carries “or savings” and its origin is not established here | | 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (SOX § 304) | n.7, n.18 | ✅ Read 25 Aug 2026; the record’s account at n.18 and at the comparative table is exact. Trigger verbatim: “If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement.” The statute does not say whose misconduct — which is what makes the no-fault reading possible and is the whole of the point. Reaches “the chief executive officer and chief financial officer” only; lookback is “the 12-month period following the first public issuance or filing”; categories are “any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation” and “any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer”; and (b) “The Commission may exempt any person.” Every limb the record calls the known weakness is confirmed present | | 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (Exchange Act § 21F) | n.11; SEC. 11 | ✅ Read 25 Aug 2026. The closest transplant in the Act; every operative term matches. Threshold: “monetary sanctions exceeding $1,000,000” = SEC. 11’s $[1,000,000]. Range: “not less than 10 percent, in total, of what has been collected of the monetary sanctions imposed” and “not more than 30 percent” = SEC. 11’s “not less than 10 and not more than 30 percent of the sanctions collected” — including collected rather than imposed, which is the limb that matters and which the Act got right. Mandatory in both (“shall pay” / “shall receive”). Fund: awards paid from the SEC Investor Protection Fund = SEC. 10(f). Anonymity: “shall be represented by counsel if the whistleblower anonymously submits” = SEC. 11(b)’s “anonymously through counsel” | | 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)–(2) | new row 25 Aug 2026; SEC. 6(a) | ✅ Read 25 Aug 2026. The federal model for SEC. 6(a) that this project has never claimed. (c)(1) punishes one who “negligently violates” — up to one year on a first conviction, $2,500–$25,000 per day. (c)(2) punishes one who “knowingly violates” — up to three years. Read with (c)(6) below, federal law imposes criminal liability on a responsible corporate officer for a merely negligent violation, at the misdemeanor level, which is SEC. 6(a)’s exact shape. And Ahmad’s objection does not reach it: (c)(1) is a misdemeanor, not a “felony punishable by years in federal prison” | | 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) | comparative § 5 | “Person” means — not “includes” — “any responsible corporate officer”: the doctrine codified, criminal subsection. Read-status and the verbatim text live on the row above under “The doctrine”; this row records the comparative use only | | 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(6) | comparative § 5 | ✅ Read 25 Aug 2026, verbatim: “For the purpose of this subsection, the term ‘person’ includes, in addition to the entities referred to in section 7602(e) of this title, any responsible corporate officer.” Note the verb. The CWA at § 1319(c)(6) says “means… in addition to”; the CAA says “includes… in addition to.” Both expand, but they are not the same drafting choice, and an adopting state’s counsel will pick one. The same codification in the Clean Air Act, added 1977 — post-Park | | United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998) | comparative § 5 | ✅ Text read 25 Aug 2026, pincite unconfirmed: post-Park retention read as congressional ratification. See the criminal-topic row above for the transcribed passages | | United States v. Hodges X-Ray, Inc., 759 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1985) | comparative § 5 | The officer rationale “even more persuasive” for civil liability (at 561) | | United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991) | the gallery’s escape section; already a crime § limb 2 | “Intentionally” attaches to access, not damage; the accidental self-replicating outbreak, convicted | | 7 U.S.C. § 7734 | the gallery’s escape section | Knowing movement of a noxious weed: five-year felony | | 42 C.F.R. § 73.19 | the gallery’s escape section; who has to tell you § 4b; Amendment 18 | The select-agent escape clock: immediate notice, Form 3 in seven days | | Lyness, 64 B.C. L. Rev. 253 (2023) | comparative § 5; for legislators § 4 | The federal and state environmental RCO survey; the four-goal revitalization agenda. Cited against this Act as well as for it: he argues the state doctrine should carry “individual civil liability—and only civil liability,” and that Dotterweich and Park supply misdemeanor-scale authority “during a time when the immediate and collateral consequences were different” (at 297–98). Full article read 25 Aug 2026 | | Hustis & Gotanda, 25 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 169 (1994) | comparative § 5 | The enforcement-wave record (officers 80% of individuals prosecuted); the objection’s title | | 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (PLCAA) | field notes 3 (objection bank) | Gun-maker immunity as a legislative choice, not a default | | 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (Price-Anderson) | field notes 6 | The purchased shield — cap paid for with channeled liability | | 10 C.F.R. Part 55; § 50.5 | field notes 6 | Individually licensed operators; the deliberate-misconduct rule | | 17 C.F.R. § 240.10D-1 | n.7, n.18 | Mandatory clawback; the flat indemnification bar | | 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-06 | n.23 | Seven-year retention by rule | | 21 C.F.R. § 803.3(w) | SEC. 1(b)(8) (current); superseded by Amendment 1 at v3.5 | The serious-injury definition being replaced | | 21 C.F.R. § 803.3, § 803.50(c), § 803.53(b), § 803.56 | n.9; regulations Parts 1.2–1.3, 5.3–5.4 | Awareness triggers, reportable information, escalation, supplemental reports | | 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 | n.10, n.19 | Live proof that indexing works — $25,000 to $68,445 by rule | | U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(c)–(d) | n.21 | Stacking only to the total punishment required | | Model Penal Code § 7.06(1), (1)(c) | n.21 | The aggregate-cap tradition — stricter than the Kansas double rule |
III. State and foreign law
Authority
Cited at
For
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22757.12
SEC. 3(c)(4); n.24, n.27; standards
✅ Read in full (census: “the chaptered text read in full”, pinned verbatim). Interim standard — the frontier-framework duty. The only one of the Act’s three adopted standards that has been read by a human
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22757.13, § 22757.15
n.19, n.27
Incident clocks; the $1,000,000 severity-scaled penalty
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 1421, § 1427, § 1426
SEC. 3(c)(4); n.19, n.24, n.27; standards
✅ § 1421 read in full 25 Aug 2026 from the enacted chapter text (sibling New York repository), discharging the census’s R grade. Interim standard. Four provisions the Act adopts and never mentions: (1)(j) internal-use catastrophic risk and oversight circumvention; (4)(a)(ii) a duty not to misstate compliance with one’s own framework, which is SEC. 8’s offense owed by the entity; (4)(b) a good-faith-and-reasonableness defense; (5) a trade-secret redaction right with five-year unredacted retention. See PF-11
N.Y. Penal Law § 80.00(1)
n.19
State-native gain-scaled fines
Illinois P.A. 104-0538 (SB 315) § 10, § 15, § 25
SEC. 3(c)(4); n.19, n.23, n.27; standards
✅ § 10 read in full 25 Aug 2026 from the enrolled slip law, discharging the census’s R grade. Interim standard. § 10(a)(1)–(10) is the same ten-item framework list as N.Y. § 1421(1)(a)–(j), including (a)(10) internal use; § 10(c)(3) adds a machine-readable format requirement New York lacks. See PF-10
K.S.A. 21-6819(b)(4)
SEC. 10(c)(3); n.21
The double rule behind the [forty]-year cap
Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.14(C)(4)
SEC. 10(c)(3); n.21
Findings-gated consecutive service
Ill. Const. art. I, § 11; Or. Const. art. I, § 16; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 16; W. Va. Const. art. III, § 5
n.21
State proportionality clauses stricter than Harmelin. Text status, 26 Aug 2026, clause by clause.Illinois — quoted in full in the Comments. Indiana — ✅ READ IN THE DOCUMENT 26 Aug 2026, in a Justia print of Article 1 now held on the source library, and confirmed character for character against the Indiana General Assembly’s own constitution PDF (current to 5 Nov. 2024): “Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.” The Comments had cited it bare; it is now pinned, and it is the last of the two clauses the retrieval list called the quiet scandal.West Virginia — art. III § 5 is present in a whole-constitution capture held on the source library, unread. Oregon — ⚠ the Comments quotes it and nobody has pinned it. ⚠ Collision recorded before it bites: Oregon and Indiana are both art. § 16, both open the same way, and differ by three words — the Comments gives Oregon as “proportioned to the offense” and Indiana reads “proportioned to the nature of the offense.” Pin Oregon against Oregon’s own publication, never against Indiana’s
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 552.104 (TRAIGA)
field notes 13
The sixty-day cure period the Act declines
Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW) ss 272, 272A–272B
n.7, n.18
Penalty insurance as an offense — enter, provide, benefit
The enforcement gap stated by the subcommittee chair (printed p. 1); the two-prong criminal test and the escalation-to-CEO finding (pp. 15, 26); the best statement of the wait-for-the-courts objection and Durbin’s § 230 rejoinder (pp. 13, 18, 20). ⚠ Body text read by validated font decode; appendix by OCR and not publication-grade. Also unheld, and recorded here 26 Aug 2026 because the verification record carried it and this table did not: the separate govinfo -add1.pdf package of submitted letters and statements
S. Hrg. 119-505, Less Hype, More Help, S. Commerce Subcomm. on Science, Manufacturing, and Competitiveness (3 Mar. 2026)
docs/known_objections.md
An industry witness’s statement that AI “operates within” existing accountability frameworks and that regulatory predictability supports deployment. ⚠ Senators’ statements unread
S. Hrg. 119-255, Hidden Harms: Examining Whistleblower Allegations That Meta Buried Child Safety Research, S. Judiciary Subcomm. on Privacy, Technology, and the Law (9 Sept. 2025)
standards/who_has_to_tell_you.md § 4d
The mechanism by which internal safety findings become unrecoverable without anyone destroying anything: a ninety-day raw-data deletion policy plus removal of lines from the report (printed pp. 14, 28-29). Sworn allegation, not adjudicated fact; cite only with that limit attached
S. Hrg. 119-284, AI’ve Got a Plan: America’s AI Action Plan, S. Commerce Subcomm. on Science, Manufacturing, and Competitiveness (10 Sept. 2025)
docs/known_objections.md
The executive branch’s own statement of the preemption position, and the concession inside it that patchwork compliance advantages the largest firms (printed pp. 8, 13-14)
N.Y. S 1169-B (2025-26), Gonzalez, §§ 109, 110, 114
The most developed auditor-independence text in any American AI bill held here; a statutory anonymous internal disclosure channel with a monthly status duty; and a pleading-stage presumption of violation and causation which an audit alone may not rebut. A bill, not law; status unverified
Federal agency action — opened 26 August 2026
Authority
Cited at
For
Trump v. Slaughter, No. 25-332 (U.S. 2026)
the federalism topic
✅ READ, 26 Aug 2026, and the commentary’s account was right. The holding, verbatim: “If anything more is left of Humphrey’s, we overrule it.” What survives of the 1935 case is only “its observation that an agency that ‘exercises no part of the executive power’ need not fall within the rule of Presidential removal” ✅ And the question this row asked is answered: SEC. 3’s Agency is untouched. The decision rests entirely on Article II and the President’s removal power over federal officers. The phrase “state agency” does not appear in the opinion, and nothing in its reasoning reaches a State’s power to structure its own agencies, which is a matter for that State’s own constitution ⚠ What is exposed is rhetorical, and it is still owed. SEC. 3 is built on the independent-commission model and that model has lost its federal exemplar. A legislator who asks why a State should build one now has a fair question with a good answer — the objection is about Article II and a State is not subject to it — and that answer is written nowhere in this repository (E75) ⚠ Slip opinion, No. 25-332, OT2025, argued 8 Dec. 2025, decided 29 June 2026; no U.S. Reports pincite from this copy
FTC, Policy Statement Concerning the Suppression of Accuracy in Artificial Intelligence, File No. P264200, 91 Fed. Reg. 41638 (7 July 2026)
SEC. 0(a)(4); SEC. 13(c); the federalism topic
✅ PRIMARY NOW HELD AND READ IN FULL, 26 Aug 2026 (Federal Register print, five pages, on the source library). The secondary made it sound broader than it is — Lawfare reported that the Commission “asserted that Section 5 could preempt certain state AI laws,” which is true and omits the limit. Verbatim: “Although the FTC Act does not expressly preempt State law, State law is impliedly preempted to the extent it conflicts with a Federal regulatory scheme. A State law that requires an AI firm to deceive its consumers obviously conflicts with section 5’s express purpose.” The theory is conflict preemption confined to state laws “requiring alterations to the accurate outputs of AI models” — it names Colorado’s revised AI Act, references California, and rests on E.O. 14319’s “ideological agendas” framing. It does not reach this Act, and SEC. 0(a)(4) is why: no provision “requires any person to express, adopt, endorse, or refrain from expressing any opinion… or to alter the output of any covered system.” SEC. 9(c) says the same of reports. That finding was drafted against compelled speech and answers this instead
Wistisen v. Alibaba Group Holding Limited, No. 1:26-cv-06654 (S.D.N.Y., filed 4 Aug. 2026)
caption corrected 26 Aug 2026; known objections
⚠ Unread; a docket metadata stub is held, not the complaint. Caption, docket number, court and filing date confirmed against the CourtListener RECAP index on 26 Aug 2026. A securities class action against Alibaba and its chief executive personally, alleging investors were misled about the company’s AI-related activities and the risks attending them, known here from The D&O Diary. Relevant to the “existing law already reaches officers” objection: it shows securities law reaching an officer for AI statements. ⚠ Correction carried: this row previously read In re Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. Securities Litigation. That caption was never in any source this project held — the D&O Diary piece names no case at all and calls it “the Alibaba SCA” throughout. See E54
V. Scholarship
Authority
Cited at
For
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968)
n.19
Deterrence requires the expected sanction to exceed the benefit
Gneezy & Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1 (2000)
n.19
Why a payable fine is a price
Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 45 (1986)
n.19
Why fines alone cannot reach the judgment-proof or the equity-rich
Guidelight AI Standards, Control Assessment of Frontier AI Companies (18 Aug 2026)
known objections, reasonable inquiry; SEC. 3(c)(4)(C)
✅ Read in the primary 25 Aug 2026 (held in the working library). Six practices from public information only, June–Aug 2026. Anthropic C+ (2.50), OpenAI C+ (2.50), Google D+ (1.50), xAI D− (0.83), Meta F (0.67). “no company’s score on any practice exceeded a 3.” “[T]he best public evidence is that companies have few containment protocols ready for an emergency.” “Three companies describe logging at least some internal usage that is then scanned for signs of misbehavior.” “Four of them (all but xAI) participated in METR’s first Frontier Risk Report.” No byline; rubric not audited here
VI. Candidate authorities — read since v3.4, not yet cited
The July–August 2026 research produced two authorities strong enough to name here, held separately because neither is yet cited in the operative text or the Comments. They are candidates for v3.5, flagged for the enforcement and premise topics.
Authority
Bears on
For
Moffatt v. Air Canada, 2024 BCCRT 149 (14 Feb. 2024)
SEC. 0; the “can a model act” premise
An adjudicated rejection of the defense that software is “a separate legal entity that is responsible for its own actions” (¶27). A tribunal has already answered the core “but the AI did it” objection: liability stays with the legal person who deployed it.
✅ READ, 26 Aug 2026, and both propositions are verbatim. From the abstract: “no matter how much AI Agents seem like human agents, they need not, and should not, be given legal personhood status. In short, humans are responsible for AI Agents’ actions.” And the shield reasoning: “Anthropomorphizing software confuses issues and could lead to a world where software has legal personhood, related rights, and liability shields. If that happens, the power for people to use software would grow while also increasing the ability to avoid responsibility. That is the situation to avoid.” Ally on the premise, not the mechanism — confirmed on the same page, “responsible AI Agents are about responsible human action”, by authors who prefer design standards and product-liability benchmarks to personal criminal duties. Cite for the premise only, never as endorsing the Act’s method
Concord Music Group, Inc. v. Anthropic PBC, No. 5:24-cv-03811 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2025) (van Keulen, M.J.)
SEC. 4; the enforcement topic, question 5
A court, on evidence, finding that a frontier developer’s chief executive personally held knowledge of model training that nobody else could supply — the factual premise of SEC. 4, found rather than asserted. Amodei ordered to sit for a deposition, capped at 2.5 hours, over Anthropic’s argument that he lacked unique knowledge. ⚠ The order has not been retrieved; this rests on secondary reporting and neither source names the apex doctrine. Not citable until the docket entry is in hand. Civil discovery, not criminal liability, and “intimately involved in training” is not “final authority to prevent or halt” ✅ Docket metadata stub held 26 Aug 2026, confirmed against the CourtListener RECAP index: 5:24-cv-03811, N.D. Cal., filed 26 June 2024. The docket sheet itself is not held
Kadrey v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 3:23-cv-03417-VC, 2025 WL 1752484 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2025)
n.19; the proportionality topic
The district court’s answer to the “liability would stop the technology” argument: “the suggestion that adverse copyright rulings would stop this technology in its tracks is ridiculous … If using copyrighted works to train the models is as necessary as the companies say, they will figure out a way to compensate copyright holders for it.” ⚠ Quoted at second hand, from Maxwell Pritt’s written answers at S. Hrg. 119-202 printed p. 93, read by OCR. The opinion itself has not been retrieved and the pin cite is his, not ours. Do not cite until the slip opinion is in hand ⚠ Docket number corrected 26 Aug 2026 from 23-CV-03217-VC. The witness’s submitted answers give two different numbers two footnotes apart — 03217 at n.1 and 03417 at n.2 — and this project took the first without reading to the bottom of the page. CourtListener’s RECAP index confirms 3:23-cv-03417, N.D. Cal., filed 7 July 2023. A docket metadata stub is now held. See E55
VII. Open items in this table
The cite-check queue (Comments, Open issues item 10) as it bears on the entries above, revised 26 August 2026 against the source library as it now stands: U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) — ✅ the 2025 Manual print, 553 pp., is now held, so this is a read rather than a retrieval; Model Penal Code § 7.06 against an ALI print — still mirror-pinned only, and no free source was found; the Ohio § 2929.14(C)(4)(a)–(c) subclauses verbatim — ⚠ codes.ohio.gov refused the connection on 26 August from two independent networks, so this is the site rather than any one route; W. Va. Const. art. III, § 5 — ✅ present in a whole-constitution capture now held; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 16 — ◐ text pinned on 26 August from two independent publishers but through a model-mediated fetch (E57), so the clause is known and the document is not held; the Illinois Act’s ILCS compilation cite — ⚠ ilga.gov refused the connection, though the enrolled act is already on the source library; Monsanto v. Durnell’s U.S. Reports pagination; and the NSW s 272A penalty-unit maxima from primary — ⚠ the NSW legislation site and its AustLII mirror both refused a machine. Everything else above has been read against a primary or first-party source at some point in the record; this table does not re-verify, it locates.
Compiled 20 August 2026 against the v3.4 tag. Corrections to FrontierAIAccountabilityProject@proton.me; they enter the corrections register like everything else.