The pre-review pass, 24 August 2026 (frozen)
The maintainer asked whether it is time to recheck the statute and the open items and to make the reviewers’ work easier by pre-finding problems and drafting fixes. This file is the first pass: each entry states the issue, where it lives, and — where a repair can responsibly be drafted — candidate language. House rules govern: CURE numbering and adoption are the maintainer’s alone; nothing here amends any tagged text; the reviewer-page freeze is respected (this file is linked from reviewer surfaces only after the freeze lifts). A reviewer who refutes a pre-find has produced a finding, exactly as with any CURE.
PF-1 · Caught and fixed before publication: the project’s own page misstated the Act’s
compliance-credit design
The first draft of the half-statute page described the Act’s treatment of framework conformity as “evidence, weighed, for a jury” and nothing more. The statute is more precise and more generous: under the standards section’s element-and-due-care paragraph, documented conformity with the standards applicable at the time satisfies the duty of due care as to the matters conformed — with the entity’s own framework, standing alone, expressly “evidence neither of due care nor of its absence” (SEC. 6(a)). The page was corrected before it was ever pushed; the distinction it now carries — who chose the stick, and what it measures — is stronger than the imprecision it replaced. Logged here because the catch is itself evidence for the pre-review method: the first inconsistency this pass found was ours.
PF-2 · CURE candidate — the chosen-stick clause (anti-inoculation hardening)
The gap. The Act credits conformity with its own applicable standards (the three adopted enactments, then promulgated standards). It is silent on frameworks outside that set. An amendment in committee — the TRAIGA pattern arriving as a floor amendment — could graft “or a similarly recognized risk-management framework” onto the credit sentence, converting the bounded design into the self-chosen defense the half-statute page documents. The Act should carry its answer in text, so the hostile amendment has to delete a sentence rather than add one.
Candidate language (placement: the standards section’s element-and-due-care paragraph, as a concluding sentence):
Conformity with any standard, framework, or guideline other than the standards applicable under this Act is admissible as evidence bearing on due care, to the weight the trier of fact assigns it; it satisfies no duty, establishes no defense, and is not a substitute for any validation, certification, record, or report this Act requires.
Why this shape: it preserves fair use of genuine outside diligence (admissible, weighed) while foreclosing the conversion of a self-selected badge into an element-defeating shield — the Park allocation, stated as drafting.
Resolved 24 August 2026: numbered Amendment 20; language transplanted verbatim to the queue.
PF-3 · CURE candidate — the certification register (the trust mechanism made visible)
The gap. SEC. 8 builds the certification on the 18 U.S.C. § 1350 structure, and the interim standards provide that any publication duty “is performed under this Act by transmission to the Agency, and publication is permitted but not required.” The felony consequence gives the signature its weight — but nothing makes the fact of certification publicly visible, and the affirmative trust frame argues that visibility is half the point: § 1350 certifications restore belief because the market can see who signed. As drafted, a member of the public cannot learn whether a deployed system’s certification exists, who signed it, or when.
Candidate language (placement: SEC. 8, new concluding subsection):
The Agency shall maintain a public register stating, for each certification filed under this section: the identity and office of each certifying person; the entity; the model version or configuration certified; the date of filing; and whether the filing certifies compliance or discloses identified noncompliance. The content of a certification beyond these facts is not required to be published. Omission from the register of a filed certification affects no liability of any certifying person.
Why this shape: facts public, content protected — the register creates the trust surface without forcing disclosure of anything a trade-secret clause protects, and the final sentence prevents the register’s own administration from becoming anyone’s defense or trap.
Resolved 24 August 2026: numbered Amendment 21; language transplanted verbatim to the queue.
PF-4 · Companion-note candidate — why the interim standards are these three
The standards section adopts California, New York, and Illinois — the frontier-duty trio — and not Texas or Colorado. The half-statute page now supplies the reason the Comments should state in a note: the excluded acts are framework-defense architectures whose operative core is an affirmative defense, and adopting them as standards would import the inoculation design into this Act’s own measuring stick. The choice was right; it should also be visibly right.
PF-5 · Standing observations, no change proposed
The Pressley–Schneier exchange (Serial 119-31) is SEC. 4’s problem statement said aloud — exhibit, not amendment. SEC. 6(b)(1)’s false-certification felony already closes the loop PF-3’s register makes visible. The [ten]-year recidivism window, the [90]-day compliance period, and the [540]-day initial-standards clock remain bracketed adopting-state choices; the fiscal note’s rules govern how they are costed, and no pre-find alters them.
The method, so the next pass can repeat it
Read the newest record first; then reread the operative text asking one question per instrument: if this instrument’s drafters sat in the markup for this Act, what single sentence would they add or delete? Draft the counter-sentence. File it here, numbered PF-n, fix reserved to the maintainer, refutation invited from every topic.
The queue this file feeds: the v3.5 CURE language — candidates enter it only by the maintainer’s numbering. The freeze: reviewer surfaces link here after the criminal-law call. The instruments cited: the verification record.
PF-6 · Observation — the leaky-trigger critique is answered by existing architecture
Added by maintainer ruling, 24 August 2026. No text change proposed. The strongest current critique of compute-denominated coverage — smuggled compute ⚠, small-compute research outside any transparency regime, the compute unit itself “a fuzzy metric” in the forecasters’ own words — defeats a compute-only statute. This Act is not one: the bright line is one route among several (self-designation, Amendment 6; Agency capability designation; the enterprise architecture held at Amendment 7). Recorded so a reviewer meets the answer where the critique will occur to them. Sources owned at the forecasters’ arithmetic § 6 and two visions.
PF-7 · CURE candidate — SEC. 8 names a mental state SEC. 6(a) does not require, and § 1350 has no tier that low
Found 25 August 2026 by reading 18 U.S.C. § 1350 in full, in the course of verifying the twelve statutory citations in the tagged text. Primary read; see the table of authorities.
What § 1350 actually contains. Two tiers, and both require knowledge:
(c)(1) “Whoever certifies any statement as set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of this section knowing that the periodic report accompanying the statement does not comport with all the requirements set forth in this section shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”
(c)(2) “Whoever willfully certifies any statement … knowing that the periodic report … does not comport … shall be fined not more than $5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”
There is no tier below knowledge in § 1350. An executive who certifies without adequate inquiry, but without knowing the report is non-compliant, commits no offense under it at all.
What this Act does. SEC. 8 closes: “Knowing false certification is an offense under SEC. 6(b)(1); reckless certification without reasonable inquiry is an offense under SEC. 6(a).” The first limb tracks § 1350. The second has no counterpart in the model, and the Act elsewhere describes itself as built “on the structure of 18 U.S.C. § 1350.”
And the second limb misdescribes its own destination. SEC. 6(a)’s element is that the person “failed to exercise due care,” measured against “the conduct of a reasonably prudent controlling person in like circumstances.” That is negligence. SEC. 8 advertises recklessness, which is higher. So a certification made negligently without reasonable inquiry — not recklessly — still satisfies SEC. 6(a), while the section that tells the officer what signing exposes them to says it does not.
Why it matters more than a word. Three things:
One. The half-statute page and n.8 of the v3.3 Comments both defend SEC. 8 from § 1350 by argument from practice: § 1350’s maxima are three to six times this Act’s base felony tier, and “executives have signed under harsher terms every quarter since 2002.” That argument covers the ceiling and says nothing about the floor. The tier most certifying officers would actually be exposed to is the one the precedent does not reach.
Two. It is a fair-notice problem in the one provision the entire Act exists to make a natural person sign. SEC. 8 is where an officer learns what the signature costs, and it currently understates it.
Three. The doctrine is on the Act’s side and only the label is wrong. United States v. DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626 (8th Cir. 2016) — ✅ read 25 August 2026 — Gruender, J., concurring: “Park requires a finding of negligence in order to convict a responsible corporate officer under § 331.” SEC. 6(c)’s culpability floor (“No custodial sentence may be imposed absent proof of at least the failure of due care described in subsection (a)”) is doing exactly that work, correctly. The Act is right on the doctrine and loose on the word.
Candidate language (placement: SEC. 8, closing sentence, one word):
Knowing false certification is an offense under SEC. 6(b)(1); certification without reasonable inquiry is an offense under SEC. 6(a), which requires proof of the failure of due care described in that subsection.
The alternative, and a reviewer should choose between them rather than accept the first. Raise SEC. 6(a) to the recklessness SEC. 8 already advertises, as to certification only. That narrows the Act and buys the § 1350 analogy outright. It also abandons the negligence floor DeCoster says Park supplies, which is the Act’s strongest answer to the Ahmad attack on the felony tier. The choice is between a defensible analogy and a defensible doctrine, and it belongs to the criminal-law reviewer.
Amended the same day — there is a third answer, and it is better than both
Added on reading 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)–(2) and (c)(6) in the primary, later on 25 August 2026.
The premise above is too narrow. § 1350 is not the Act’s only federal model, and the other one reaches exactly where SEC. 6(a) reaches.
§ 1319(c)(1): any person who “negligently violates” — imprisonment not more than one year on a first conviction.
§ 1319(c)(6): “For the purpose of this subsection, the term ‘person’ means, in addition to the definition contained in section 1362(5) of this title, any responsible corporate officer.”
(c)(6) governs the whole of subsection (c), so it governs (c)(1). Federal law therefore imposes criminal liability on a responsible corporate officer for a merely negligent violation, at the misdemeanor level, and has since 1987. United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999) ✅ read in the opinion 26 August 2026: “a person who acts with ordinary negligence in violating 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) may be subject to criminal penalties.” Pincites unconfirmed (E47). The read also produced a circuit split, a due process holding and a canon of construction that bear on the whole criminal topic — carried at Amendment 24.
That is SEC. 6(a), limb for limb: a responsible officer, a failure of care rather than knowledge, and a one-year misdemeanor ceiling at SEC. 10(b).
So the repair is a citation, not an amendment. SEC. 8’s first limb is § 1350-shaped and says so; its second limb is § 1319(c)(1)-shaped and says nothing. The Act names one model and takes two. Raising SEC. 6(a) to recklessness would abandon a floor federal law has held for four decades in order to fit a statute that was never its donor.
And it takes the sting out of Ahmad. Ahmad refuses public-welfare treatment to CWA discharges and offers as confirmation that those violations “are felonies punishable by years in federal prison.” § 1319(c)(1) is a misdemeanor. Whatever Ahmad does to a felony tier, it does not reach a one-year negligence offense, which makes SEC. 6(a) the least vulnerable part of the whole federal analogy rather than the most.
The irony worth recording. This repository already held Hanousek — as an objection, in the criminal topic, beside Ahmad, for Justice Thomas’s complaint that the CWA reaches “persons using standard equipment to engage in a broad range of ordinary industrial and commercial activities.” The same provision Thomas criticizes is the precedent SEC. 6(a) needed. We had the answer filed under attacks.
Administrative load: none. One sentence in SEC. 8, or one clause in SEC. 6(a); on the amended reading, a citation added to the Comments and nothing in the tagged text at all.
Resolved 26 August 2026: numbered Amendment 24; language transplanted to the queue.
PF-8 · CURE candidate — SEC. 10(d) cites two FDCA remedies and takes the protections of neither
Found 25 August 2026 by reading 21 U.S.C. §§ 332 and 334 in the primary, continuing the statutory citation verification that produced PF-7.
One. The jury the source supplies in exactly this situation. SEC. 10(d)(2) provides that “operation of a suspended configuration in this State by any person with notice of the suspension is contempt and a violation of SEC. 5(a).” That double character — contempt of an order which is also a substantive offense — is the precise case 21 U.S.C. § 332(b) legislates for:
“In case of violation of an injunction or restraining order issued under this section, which also constitutes a violation of this chapter, trial shall be by the court, or, upon demand of the accused, by a jury.”
The Act cites § 332 for the injunction and drops § 332(b). Ordinary law would supply a jury only where the contempt sentence is serious; § 332(b) supplies it by statute whenever the two characters overlap, without a petty/serious inquiry. This project’s discipline is to notice provisions running against the defendant, and this is one — created by omission rather than by drafting.
Candidate language (placement: SEC. 10(d), new final sentence):
In any proceeding for contempt of an order under this subsection where the conduct also constitutes a violation of SEC. 5, trial shall be by the court or, upon demand of the accused, by a jury.
Two. The § 334 citation over-claims, and the gap it hides is a real one. § 334 is in rem: an article “proceeded against… on libel of information and condemned,” procedure conforming “as nearly as may be, to the procedure in admiralty,” and “on demand of either party any issue of fact… shall be tried by jury.” SEC. 10(d)(2) takes the thing-directed idea and none of that apparatus. Functionally it is prospective and injunctive — § 332’s relative, not § 334’s — and it binds “any person with notice,” which is a remedy against software that reaches non-parties. § 334 answered that problem with admiralty procedure and the right of claimants to appear. This Act answers it with notice alone.
Two ways out, and a reviewer should pick rather than accept the first. Either re-cite SEC. 10(d)(2) to § 332 and describe it as the injunction it actually is, which costs nothing and stops the citation over-claiming; or keep the § 334 framing and import what makes an in rem remedy fair — a right for any person claiming an interest in the identified configuration to appear and contest, before the suspension binds them.
And it touches the takings topic. A proceeding directed at an identified model version, binding everyone with notice, is closer to the per se limb of the takings objection than to the regulatory one, because it operates on the thing rather than on conduct. That connection is not made anywhere in this repository and the takings section should carry it.
Administrative load: none for option one. Option two adds an appearance procedure.
Resolved 26 August 2026: numbered Amendment 25; language transplanted to the queue.
PF-9 · The Act’s operative content for its first four years rests on two statutes nobody has read
Found 25 August 2026 at the end of the statutory citation verification. No error is alleged and nothing here contradicts the record — every grade below is the census’s own. The finding is that the grades have never been added up.
What SEC. 3(c)(4) does. It adopts three enacted statutes as this Act’s interim standards, “each as in effect on [1 August 2026] … as they so exist and not as they may afterward be amended,” and then disapplies a list of their features: revenue thresholds, exemptions, effective and phase-in dates, territorial terms (A); duties to publish, converted to transmission (B); third-party assessment or audit (C); incident reporting, penalties, enforcement, fees, assessments and whistleblowers (D).
Between the effective date and the Agency’s own standards — year four on the statute’s own clock — those three statutes minus that list ARE this Act’s substantive content. SEC. 3(c)(2) says so: the certification duty of SEC. 8 operates from day 180, “the applicable standards for its purposes being the interim standards of paragraph (4).”
How well the project knows them, per its own census:
| Adopted standard | The census’s grade | What that means |
|---|---|---|
| Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22757.12 | ✅ “the chaptered text read in full” | Read |
| N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 1421 | ⚠ R “opened and searched directly… not yet read by a human eye” | Word-searched |
| Illinois P.A. 104-0538 § 10 | ⚠ R “the legislature’s own slip-law PDF was opened. Not yet read by a human eye” | Word-searched |
One of three is read.
Why a word search is the wrong instrument for this particular job
The census’s word tests were built to answer a question they answer well: does this statute make a natural person sign anything? For that, absence is the finding, and searching for certify, officer, signature and natural person is exactly right. The New York row is short for a good reason and its conclusion is almost certainly correct.
SEC. 3(c)(4) asks the opposite question. It does not ask what these statutes lack. It imports what they contain, minus an enumerated list, and a word search cannot establish that the list is complete. Any duty in § 1421 or in P.A. 104-0538 that is not a revenue threshold, a publication requirement, a third-party audit, an incident-reporting provision, a penalty, an enforcement mechanism, a fee or a whistleblower protection is adopted into this Act unchanged, and has not been read.
The disapplication list was drafted from the categories the drafter expected, which is the same method the vocabulary audit used in August and the same limit it hit: a list of expected features cannot contain the unexpected one. That audit missed takings. This one may have missed nothing at all — but the project cannot say so, and it currently implies otherwise by treating all three as settled.
What would close it
A full read of two statutes, against one question: what duty does this impose that SEC. 3(c)(4) neither adopts deliberately nor disapplies? Everything found is either a deliberate import to be stated, or an addition to the disapplication list. It is a bounded afternoon’s work on two documents, one of which is already in the working library.
It is also the highest-value unread item in the repository, above the twenty flagged authorities, because those are support for arguments and this is the Act’s own operative text for four years. A reviewer who asks “what exactly does this Act require on day 181?” is owed an answer read from the source, and today the honest answer is that two-thirds of it has been searched rather than read.
PF-10 · Illinois § 10 read in full, as PF-9 said to. Four things the disapplication list did not anticipate
Read 25 August 2026 from the enrolled slip law held in the working library (BILL_IL-SB315_enrolled_PA104-0538_LegiScan), against the single question PF-9 poses: what does this impose that SEC. 3(c)(4) neither adopts deliberately nor disapplies? PF-9 was filed less than an hour before this. It is answered here for one of the two statutes; New York remains open.
One — the interim standards already reach internal use, and Decision 4 does not know it
§ 10(a)(10), one of ten matters a large frontier developer’s framework must address:
“assessing and managing catastrophic risk resulting from the internal use of its frontier models, including risks resulting from a frontier model circumventing oversight mechanisms.”
Nothing in SEC. 3(c)(4)’s disapplication list touches it. It is not a revenue threshold, an effective date, a publication duty, a third-party audit, an incident-reporting provision, a penalty, an enforcement mechanism, a fee, or a whistleblower protection. It is adopted.
And § 10(a) requires the developer to “write, implement, comply with” the framework. So compliance with the interim standards includes complying with one’s own framework as to internal-use catastrophic risk and oversight circumvention. SEC. 8 certifies compliance with the applicable standards. Knowing false certification is a felony under SEC. 6(b)(1).
Decision 4 says the Act does not reach the evaluation conduct it was written after, because SEC. 2(a) tethers every duty to in-state deployment. That remains true of the conduct. But this is a different route to the same place: the certification may already reach internal-use risk management even where SEC. 2(a) does not reach the internal use itself. A developer who certifies compliance while its framework’s internal-use provisions are a fiction is exposed under SEC. 8 and SEC. 6(b)(1) without SEC. 2(a) doing any work at all.
⚠ Stated as a question, not a finding, because it turns on a construction nobody here can settle: whether “compliance with the applicable standards” in SEC. 8 reaches compliance with the framework the standards require you to write. If it does, OQ4 is smaller than the repository says, and the paperwork route this project has been apologizing for is the route. The criminal and enforcement reviewers should take this before the amendment OQ4 drafts.
Two — the Act deletes the duty to be able to respond to an incident, and keeps the duty to report one
§ 10(a)(8): the framework must address “identifying and responding to critical safety incidents.”
SEC. 3(c)(4)(D) disapplies “provisions respecting incident reporting.” (a)(8) is not a reporting provision — it is a capability requirement, owed inward. Read broadly, (D) removes it, leaving SEC. 9’s duty to tell the Agency with nothing anywhere in the Act requiring the developer to have a process for identifying and responding. Reporting without required response capability. One clause in (D) — “other than provisions requiring a framework to address the identification of and response to incidents” — closes it.
Three — (C) is broader than its purpose, and today’s evidence makes that expensive
§ 10(a)(5) requires the framework to describe how the developer approaches “using third parties to assess the potential for catastrophic risks”; § 10(c)(2)(C) requires the transparency report to summarize “the extent to which third-party evaluators were involved.”
Neither is a mandate to be audited. Both are transparency about the developer’s own practice. SEC. 3(c)(4)(C) disapplies “provisions respecting assessment or audit by a third party,” which on its face takes both — so the Act removes not only the obligation to obtain independent assessment but the obligation to say whether you sought any.
The Guidelight control assessment of 18 August 2026 (known objections) found third-party review among the weakest dimensions across all five frontier developers, and that four of five nonetheless participated in METR’s first Frontier Risk Report voluntarily. The Act disapplies the mandate and the disclosure together, at the moment the disclosure is the part doing work. (C) should be narrowed to the mandate.
Four — an operative requirement nobody has costed
§ 10(c)(3): “All summaries required under paragraph (2) shall be provided in a machine-readable format to facilitate verification of model claims.”
Not on the disapplication list, so it survives, and SEC. 3(c)(4)(B) converts publication into transmission to the Agency. Every transmitted summary therefore inherits a machine-readable requirement, which is an Agency intake-format obligation the fiscal topic has never costed and the Act never mentions.
What this says about the method. Four items, one section, one statute, one read. None was findable by word search, because each is a duty the disapplication list did not anticipate rather than a word the census was looking for. New York’s § 1421 has not had this read, and on this evidence it should have it before anything else in the repository.
Resolved 26 August 2026: numbered Amendment 26 (with PF-11); language transplanted to the queue.
PF-11 · New York § 1421 read in full. PF-9’s queue is now empty, and the Act adopts three duties, a defense and a permission it never mentions
Read 25 August 2026 from the enacted chapter text pinned at raise-officer-certification/research/raise_act_s8828_chapter_96_2026.txt. This is the reading the census graded ⚠ R, “not yet read by a human eye.” With PF-10 it closes PF-9: all three of the Act’s interim standards have now been read.
One — the internal-use provision is in two of the three, not one
§ 1421(1)(j) is word-for-word Illinois § 10(a)(10):
“assessing and managing catastrophic risk resulting from the internal use of its frontier models, including risks resulting from a frontier model circumventing oversight mechanisms.”
Indeed § 1421(1)(a)–(j) and Illinois § 10(a)(1)–(10) are the same ten items in the same order. PF-10’s question to Decision 4 therefore rests on two of the three adopted standards, not one, and correspondingly harder.
Two — the interim standards contain SEC. 8’s offense already, owed by the entity
§ 1421(4)(a), adopted and not disapplied:
“(i) A frontier developer shall not make a materially false or misleading statement about catastrophic risk from its frontier models or its management of catastrophic risk. (ii) A large frontier developer shall not make a materially false or misleading statement about its implementation of, or compliance with, its frontier AI framework.”
The census already found (i) and called it “the nearest thing in enacted American frontier law to this project’s truth-telling limb.” It did not reach (ii), which is nearer still. (ii) is SEC. 8’s false-certification offense as a substantive duty — same subject matter, owed by the entity, with no signatory. The Act adopts it and then builds SEC. 8 on top without noticing it is already there. Whether SEC. 8’s personal certification and § 1421(4)(a)(ii)’s entity duty are two duties or one described twice is a question for the enforcement reviewer, and the answer changes what a certification means.
Three — a good-faith defense the Act imports and never mentions
§ 1421(4)(b): “This subdivision shall not apply to a statement that was made in good faith and was reasonable under the circumstances.”
Not a penalty, not enforcement, not reporting: it is adopted with the duty it qualifies. So the interim standards carry a good-faith-and-reasonableness defense to the false-statement duty, and nothing in this Act refers to it. It sits directly beside SEC. 8’s “statements of fact within the certifying person’s knowledge after reasonable inquiry” and SEC. 6(a)’s due-care element, and known objections currently reports that the Act “picks neither” on whether reliance on a safety team is reasonable inquiry. It may have picked, by adoption, without saying so.
Four — WITHDRAWN the same day: Amendment 23 already owns this
This finding was written without reading Amendment 23, which was drafted earlier on 25 August and resolves it. Amendment 23 takes the identical redaction subdivision from California (§ 22757.12(f) — the same text as N.Y. § 1421(5)), states in terms that “This Act already adopted that subdivision and then disapplied it,” identifies SEC. 3(c)(4)(B) as “the only reason it does not operate,” and drafts the repair. The two readings offered below were already resolved in favor of the second, with a fix.
Recorded rather than deleted, because it is the eighth time in two days that a finding announced here was already in the register (E49 is the rule). The material below stands only as the New York confirmation that California’s subdivision has a twin.
Four (as written, superseded) — a redaction right whose survival is unresolved
§ 1421(5) permits redaction “necessary to protect such frontier developer’s trade secrets, such frontier developer’s cybersecurity, public safety, or the national security of the United States,” requires the developer to “describe the character and justification of such redaction,” and to “retain the unredacted information for five years.”
SEC. 3(c)(4)(B) converts every duty to publish into a duty to transmit to the Agency — and says nothing about whether the redaction permission travels with it. Two readings, both bad:
- It travels. A developer may then redact trade secrets from what it transmits to the Agency, which would hollow out SEC. 3’s validation materials and SEC. 8’s factual basis. The recipient is a regulator under seal, so the redaction protects nothing and costs everything.
- It does not travel. The Act has then silently removed a protection its own adopted standard grants, which is the strongest single fact available to the takings objection: the interim standard the Act adopts gives a trade-secret redaction right, and the Act’s conversion clause takes it away without a word.
The takings section currently answers the trade-secret argument by saying nothing is published and everything is sealed. That answer is now incomplete, because the question is not only where the material goes but what the developer was entitled to withhold from it.
⚠ Also unreconciled, minor: § 1421(5)(b)’s five-year retention of unredacted information against SEC. 12’s ten-years-or-five-after-last-operation. The Act’s is longer and governs, but the source’s period is adopted text and the two are never set beside each other.
Five — three standards, no conflict rule
Illinois § 10(c)(3) requires transparency summaries “in a machine-readable format”; New York has no such requirement. New York § 1421(4) and (5) carry a false-statement duty, a good-faith defense and a redaction regime; Illinois § 10 carries none of them. California is a third text again.
SEC. 3(c)(4) adopts all three as “the interim standards” and provides no rule for what happens where they diverge. (E) credits conformity documented for any one of them “to the extent of the matters documented,” which addresses crediting and not conflict. So it is currently unanswerable whether a developer measured against the interim standards gets New York’s good-faith defense, or owes Illinois’ machine-readable format, or both, or neither.
That is the largest unanswered question in SEC. 3(c)(4) and it was invisible until all three were read. It is also cheap to fix: one sentence stating whether the standards apply cumulatively (the strictest governs) or severally (conformity with any one suffices).
PF-9 is discharged. The Act’s operative content for years 0–4 has now been read in full.
Resolved 26 August 2026: numbered Amendment 26 (with PF-10); language transplanted to the queue.